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1 Introduction 
A number of prominent philosophers advance the following ideas: 
(1) Meaning is use. 
(2) Meaning is an intrinsically normative notion.  
Call (1) the use thesis, hereafter UT, and (2) the normativity thesis, hereafter NT. 
They come together in the view that for a linguistic expression to have meaning is for 
there to be certain proprieties governing its employment.
1
 
 These ideas are often associated with a third: 
(3) The norms governing the use of linguistic expressions and constitutive 
of their meanings are epistemic.  
This leads immediately to what one might call, following Skorupski (1997: 29), an 
epistemic conception of meaning, hereafter EM. While certain versions of EM—
specifically, Dummett’s—have come under pressure in recent years, others remain 
widespread and receive little critical attention. 
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 In what follows, I shall expand upon each of the above ideas. Next, I shall 
present a reason for thinking that EM is problematic. I do not take it alone to refute 
the view, but at least to motivate a reassessment of it. Accordingly, I then turn to the 
arguments in its support and suggest that they are not cogent. This is the principal task 
of the paper.  
 To anticipate, I shall suggest that EM involves a certain kind of act/object or -
ing/-ed confusion. A point emerging from this diagnosis is that one can accept UT and 
NT (and indeed several other putative insights) without thereby accepting EM. That 
is, one can continue to view the meaning of an expression as given by norms 
governing its use without taking those norms to be epistemic in nature. 
 
2 UT, NT and EM 
In several places, Wittgenstein remarks that ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language’ (1967: §43), that the ‘use of the word in practice is its meaning’ (1969: 69; 
cf. 1975: §61). Whether or not one views this as gesturing at a ‘theory’ of meaning, or 
instead as aiming primarily at dissuading us from certain misconceptions of language 
that are a source of puzzlement, it is clear that Wittgenstein held that for certain 
purposes the meaning of an expression could profitably be characterised as its use. 
 Several contemporary philosophers endorse UT.
2
 While I shall not argue for it 
here, it is intuitively attractive; it promises to remove perplexity concerning how 
expressions come to have the meanings that they do—i.e. by acquiring a distinctive 
role in a linguistic practice—and makes sense of the fact that we attribute 
understanding to speakers and meaning to expressions on the basis of how those 
speakers employ those expressions.
3
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 If one accepts UT, there appears to be good reason to equate the meaning of an 
expression, not with how it is as a matter of fact employed, but with how it is properly 
employed. Although for present purposes I shall take this claim for granted,
4
 it can be 
motivated by the observation that, in employing a term in a certain way, a speaker can 
act incorrectly; she can make mistakes. While this is not decisive, it gives prima facie 
reason to think that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion, that a statement of 
an expression’s meaning follows immediately from a statement concerning how that 
expression should, may or ought to (not) be used (and vice versa). Wright endorses 
this putative insight: 
Meaning is normative. To know the meaning of an expression is to know, perhaps 
unreflectively, how to appraise uses of it; it is to know a set of constraints to which 
uses must conform (1993: 24). 
This ‘broadly Wittgensteinian conception of meaning’, he says, ‘is familiar (and 
vague) enough to strike most people now as a harmless platitude’ (1993: 247). I shall 
pick up on three ideas expressed in this comment. 
 First, NT is indeed ‘Wittgensteinian’. Waismann records the remark that ‘the 
meaning of a sign is the effect which it should have […] not the effect that it will 
have’ (Wittgenstein and Waismann 2003: 343). Elsewhere, Wittgenstein stresses that 
‘there exists a correspondence between the concepts “rule” and “meaning”’ (1975: 
§62; cf. 1967: §108; cf. 1978: VI §29). Second, NT is certainly accepted, if not by 
‘most’, then by a significant number of philosophers.
5
 Nevertheless, and third, NT is 
‘vague’. As Wikforss comments, ‘despite extensive discussions of the topic it remains 
obscure exactly what the normativity thesis amounts to’ (2001: 203-4).
6
 
 One glaring lack of clarity concerns what kind of norm governs the 
employment of an expression. Evidently, the use of a word might be subject to an 
indefinite number of standards—moral, prudential, customary—which have nothing 
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of relevance to do with meaning. A widespread assumption is that, if there are norms 
pertaining to the meanings of expressions, they are fundamentally epistemic. 
 Typically, epistemic propriety concerns one’s justification for believing that 
such-and-such is the case. However, this does not get us far as one might have all 
sorts of justification for believing something. One might be morally justified in 
holding a belief, for example, if doing so furthers a good cause. The relevant sense of 
justification is one that, perhaps when certain other conditions are met, provides 
knowledge. Evidently, however, if the norms picked out by NT are supposed to 
concern the use of linguistic expressions, they cannot be norms governing the 
formation of belief; rather, they would be norms for asserting that such-and-such is 
the case, for making a claim to knowledge. 
 If one thinks, first, that an expression’s possessing meaning consists in its 
having a use that is subject to norms and, second, that those norms are epistemic, one 
arrives at EM.
7
 Note, however, that there is no single version. On the strongest, an 
expression is conventionally associated with perceptual conditions that warrant 
(epistemically) its assertoric use by decisively establishing the truth of what is said in 
uttering it.
8
 On a moderate version, the perceptual conditions are evidential and only 
defeasibly warrant the assertoric use of the expression. The weakest version holds that 
for an expression to have a meaning is for there to be some assertions or beliefs (not 
necessarily perceptual) that are conventionally taken to warrant its assertoric use, and 
for that use in turn to license further actions, including assertions. 
 Proponents of EM typically view it as simultaneously providing an account of 
linguistic understanding. This is motivated in part by the conviction, which Dummett 
articulates, that 
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philosophical questions about meaning are best interpreted as questions about 
understanding: a dictum about what the meaning of an expression consists in must be 
construed as a thesis about what it is to know its meaning (1993: 35).
9
 
Weak EM, for example, suggests that understanding an expression requires grasp of 
what claims or beliefs epistemically warrant the assertoric use of an expression, and 
what that use in turn licenses.
10
  
 At times, Dummett
11
 appears to endorse strong EM, but his considered view is 
the moderate (1991; 1993; 2006), as is Wright’s (1992: 17; 1993: 37; 2003: 62) and 
Putnam’s, during his ‘internal realist’ phase (1978: 128-9; 1983). The weak version is 
accepted by Brandom (1994; 2000), Skorupski (1986; 1988; 1993; 1997),
12
 
Wedgwood (2001: 6) and, at least for certain classes of expression, Boghossian 
(2003a: 240; 2003b: 25-6).
13
 A commitment to EM of some kind is also apparent in 
remarks from Wittgenstein’s middle and later writings. For example, ‘It is what is 
regarded as the justification of an assertion that constitutes the sense of an assertion’ 
(1974: I §40; cf. 1967: §353; 1979: 19, 26). Of course, such pedigree does nothing to 
show that EM offers an unproblematic perspective on meaning. It is to that matter I 
shall now turn. 
 
3 Kinds of mistake 
In this section, I shall raise a challenge to EM, based on considerations regarding the 
different kinds of mistake one might make in employing a linguistic expression.
14
 
Imagine that Sophie utters assertorically: 
(4) The pygmy shrew is Britain’s smallest mammal. 
On this occasion, Sophie expresses a truth. In addition, one can suppose that she does 
so on the basis of information received from a suitably reliable source. Sophie 
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therefore satisfies any epistemic propriety governing her act.
15
 Finally, the sentence 
contains no obvious mistakes with respect to meaning; putting such words together in 
such a way to produce that sentence is in accord with the meaning of each. Hence, 
Sophie’s act meets any standards determinative of the meaning of the expressions 
used. In sum, her assertion is factually, epistemically and semantically correct. 
 In contrast, imagine that Mike utters assertorically: 
(5) The pygmy shrew is Britain’s largest mammal. 
On this occasion, Mike expresses a falsehood. Nonetheless, supposing that he does so 
on the basis of information received from a source that is to a suitable standard 
usually reliable, Mike satisfies any epistemic propriety governing such an act of 
assertion. Finally, like (4) the sentence contains no obvious mistakes with respect to 
meaning; indeed, it is precisely because (5) is a well-formed, meaningful sentence 
that Mike is able to express a falsehood in uttering it. Hence, combining those words 
together to produce that sentence meets any standards determinative of their 
meanings. While Mike makes a mistake, it is neither semantic nor epistemic but 
factual. 
 Now imagine that Alex utters (4) assertorically. In doing so she expresses a 
truth. However, Alex does on the basis of a hunch, contrary to information supplied 
by a suitably reliable source and against the available evidence (perhaps all the pygmy 
shrews she perceived to date were unusually well-fed and so larger than the half-
starved lesser white-toothed shrews found in her garden). Hence, it would be 
appropriate to criticise Alex for making an epistemically unjustified assertion. 
Nevertheless, once more, (4) contains no obvious mistakes with respect to meaning; 
indeed, it is precisely because (4) is a well-formed, meaningful sentence that Alex 
performs an assertoric act that might rightfully be criticised as ungrounded. Hence, 
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combining those words together to produce that sentence meets any standards 
determinative of their meanings. While Alex makes a mistake, it is neither semantic 
nor factual but epistemic. 
 The possibility of such a scenario immediately suggests that EM is mistaken. 
Semantic norms cannot be epistemic, since one’s act can be correct by the standards 
of the former without being correct by the standards of the latter. 
 A proponent of EM might allow that one can commit certain epistemic 
mistakes without committing a semantic mistake; she does not hold the view that all 
matters of epistemic propriety are semantic. However, she might respond, there are 
some epistemic mistakes that would cast doubt on a person’s understanding and this is 
all EM requires. Imagine, for example, that Bernard utters: 
 (6) The common lizard is Britain’s smallest mammal. 
In doing so, he expresses a falsehood. Now, suppose that Bernard does so on the basis 
of his knowledge that the common lizard is Britain’s smallest cold-blooded, terrestrial 
vertebrate. This knowledge evidently does not support what is asserted in uttering (6). 
Hence, in addition to his factual error, Bernard makes an epistemic mistake. 
Moreover, in this instance one would equally judge that he has made a semantic 
mistake; he does not properly know what ‘mammal’ means, perhaps taking it to mean 
reptile. This shows that semantic norms are equivalent to epistemic norms. 
 One can surely accept the judgement here—that Bernard is semantically 
mistaken—without accepting the analysis—that this is due to his being epistemically 
mistaken. A reason for denying that Bernard understands ‘mammal’—and so fails to 
employ it in accord with its meaning—is that he does not grasp what entails the 
proposition expressed in its use and what it is entailed by. This pushes one only to a 
version of inferentialism, according to which making a mistake with respect to 
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meaning is to make a mistake about an expression’s inferential significance. There is 
as yet no pressure to describe the standards involved in epistemic terms. 
 Indeed, there appears positive reason not to do so. Given Bernard’s semantic 
error, one should surely not judge that he is thereby guilty of epistemic impropriety. 
Since he does not properly understand what he said in uttering (6), it would be wrong 
to criticise Bernard’s action as being one of making an assertion that lacks warrant, of 
failing to heed the evidence, or of expressing an unreasonable belief. Equally, it 
would be wrong to say that his claim is epistemically justified. It would be better to 
say that such considerations do not apply in this case. Due to his semantic 
impropriety, the epistemic standards fail to get a grip.
16
 Thus, a plausible case of 
semantic error, of the kind the EM theorist is after, is not a plausible case of epistemic 
error. The two standards diverge.
17
 
 If the advocate of EM does not share the intuition regarding how to judge this 
case, consider the following, more clear-cut example. Sharon, intending to make an 
assertion, utters: 
 (7) The pygmy shrew is a prime number. 
It is plausible to hold that, although (7) is grammatically well-formed, one can attach 
no meaning to it,
18
 in which the case Sharon fails literally to express anything in 
uttering it. Thus, Sharon neither expresses a truth nor a falsehood and, more 
importantly, neither makes a justified nor an unjustified claim. Sharon fails so 
completely to abide by the semantic norms governing the constituent expressions that 
epistemic considerations simply not apply. This provides, then, a case of semantic 
error that does not qualify for epistemic assessment. 
 The norms determinative of meaning cannot be epistemic norms, since one 
can act wrongly by the standards of the former without acting wrongly by the 
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standards of the latter. For epistemic norms to govern an act, that act must be 
antecedently subject to, and arguably satisfy, semantic norms. Hence, one cannot 
equate the two and EM is false. 
 
4 Assessing arguments for EM 
As stressed at the outset, I do not take the above criticism to be decisive; a proponent 
of EM might have the resources to respond to it. Nevertheless, it strongly invites a 
reconsideration of EM. Accordingly, one might return to the considerations offered in 
its support and judge whether they are compelling. If not, there is no pressure to find a 
solution to the alleged problem. 
 
4.1 UT and NT 
Some appear to hold that mere commitment to UT takes one to EM. Skorupski, for 
example, says that ‘the idea that use exhausts meaning […] leads to a distinctive 
conception of meaning’, namely EM (1997: 29).
19
 Though the assumption that UT 
immediately entails EM might not be anyone’s considered view, it is worth 
investigating if only to rule it out. 
 One can surely accept the dictum that meaning is use without accepting EM.
20
 
There are a number of non-epistemic ways in which UT might be interpreted. One 
might think that for ‘vixen’, for example, to have a given meaning is for there to be 
circumstances in which one might apply that word (e.g. when a vixen is present), 
certain words with which one might substitute it (e.g. ‘female’), certain expressions 
with which one might combine it (e.g. ‘is a mammal’) and with which one would not 
(e.g. ‘is prime’). This idea could be reformulated at the level of sentences in terms of 
what transitions to and from sentences involving ‘vixen’ one might make. Further 
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argument is needed to show that such a pattern of use must be interpreted as a matter 
of certain uses of expressions being epistemically warranted and warranting. 
 Irrespective of how attractive the alternative sketched is, it points to a more 
general issue regarding UT. It could only lead to EM if the relevant use is taken to be 
use in assertion or use in making a claim, that is, if the act is understood as 
illocutionary. But one might take the relevant kind of employment to be use with 
other words or use in forming a sentence (perhaps in response to the forming of other 
sentences). Call this the sentential act. While this might contribute to the making of an 
assertion, it is not equivalent to doing so. The sentential act is prior to and more 
fundamental than the assertoric act, since performing the latter depends on performing 
the former but not vice versa.
21
 Of course, there might be reasons to view the use 
relevant to UT as illocutionary—some of which will be considered below—but the 
proponent of EM cannot assume this without argument.  
 Note that sentential acts are still uses of words. The relevant ‘moves’ involve 
combining or substituting expressions in certain ways, and might amount to linguistic 
‘transitions’. They therefore concern an expression’s role ‘within’ a language. And in 
elucidating that role, and the sentential acts that exploit it, there is no barrier to 
making reference to the kinds of activities (linguistic or otherwise) it might contribute 
to. The point is only that what is done in so using words is not as such an asserting, 
although of course one might do that too.  
 By appeal to understanding, rather than meaning, Skorupski presents an 
argument from the absence of alternatives to suggest that one ought to view the 
relevant use in a way that supports EM: 
Wittgenstein’s stress on the fact that understanding language is a practical ability is 
the essential thesis from which the epistemic analysis of meaning and understanding 
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should be seen to flow. For in what practical ability could the understanding of a 
statement consist, other than the ability to recognize a state of evidence as warranting 
or not warranting the assertion of that statement (1988: 509)? 
The answer is that there are many other abilities in which understanding might 
plausibly consist (individually or cumulatively), such as the ability to combine 
expressions together in certain ways, to make transitions of a specific sort to and from 
the relevant sentence, to offer an explanation of the terms involved or to provide a 
suitable paraphrase of the sentence, and so on. 
 UT alone, then, does not lead to EM. A more common route is via UT in 
conjunction with NT. Thus, Peacocke suggests that a ‘very direct way of capturing the 
normative dimension of meaning’ would be to specify, for any given expression, ‘its 
contribution to what constitutes good reasons for accepting sentences containing it, 
and to what sentences containing it give good reason for accepting or doing’ (1998: 
97). Likewise, Skorupski proposes that, if one thinks of meaning as given by rules for 
use, ‘The most straightforward assumption to make about these rules would be that 
they combine to specify when a sentence in a language is correctly assertible’ (1997: 
32; see also Brandom 2000: 186).
22
  
 Perhaps the guiding thought here is the following. Meaning is given by norms 
for the use of expressions. Since one is dealing with language—as opposed, say, to 
hammers or money—then one should construe the relevant use as use to make 
assertions—as opposed to use to hammer nails or use to buy products. The relevant 
norms must, therefore, concern reasons for making assertions—as opposed to reasons 
to hammer a nail or reasons to buy a product. Thus, one arrives at EM. 
 However, the above observation blocks this line of thought. Even if one 
restricts attention to the assertoric use of language only—ignoring, say, orders or 
questions—there is more than one thing done in so using expressions. For our 
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purposes, one need only distinguish the sentential act of producing a sentence from 
the assertoric act of (thereby) making an assertion. Given that there are different 
things done, it is reasonable to think that there might be different standards in force. 
The assertoric act evidently answers to epistemic norms, but the sentential act as such 
would surely not (merely forming a certain sentence is not something that admits of 
epistemic assessment). In short, one can view the meaning of an expression as 
determined by norms governing its use but not view those norms as epistemic by 
taking the relevant act to be sentential rather than assertoric. Doing so has the added 
advantage that the norms apply across the board—wherever a sentential act is 
performed—and not only to those acts that constitute assertions. 
 It is becoming apparent that EM rests on a kind of act/object or –ing/-ed 
confusion. Epistemic norms concern the act of asserting a given content while, 
assuming there are such things, semantic norms pertain to the object, what is asserted. 
Of course, semantic norms too govern an act, but the sentential act, which (if it 
suitably accords with them) makes available the object for asserting. Since this is the 
case, semantic norms cannot in turn be identified with those epistemic norms that 
govern the assertoric act. 
 Wright offers a quite different argument for EM, but which again takes as its 
premises UT and NT: 
In order for these sentences [within the range of the truth-predicate] to be determinate 
in content at all, there has to be a distinction […] between proper and improper use of 
them. And since they are sentences with assertoric content, that will be a distinction 
between cases where their assertion is justified and cases where it is not. It follows 
that a norm, or complex of norms, of warranted assertibility will hold sway […] over 
the sincere and literal use of the sentences to which the T[ruth]-predicate applies 
(1992: 17; cf. 2003: 62, 12, 338).
23
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Wright arrives at EM via the claim that, since the relevant norms are determinative of 
assertoric content, they must be norms of assertion, i.e. epistemic. This move, 
however, trades on precisely the act/object ambiguity noted above. To say that some 
content is assertoric might be to say either that it is asserted or that it is assertible. 
Only the latter reading is innocuous, but only the former supports EM. No doubt 
certain norms of use must be in place for a sentence to possess assertible content, but 
it does not follow that those norms must be norms for asserting. Correlatively, no 
doubt epistemic norms must be in place for a content to be asserted, but it does not 
follow that those norms must be in place for a content to be assertible. Hence, 
Wright’s argument for EM fails. 
 Perhaps one line of thought implicitly guiding the transition from NT to EM is 
that the norms determinative of meaning must be epistemic (and hence govern 
asserting) because merely uttering a sentence is not as such a normative matter. While 
there can be reasons for or against making a claim, there can be no reasons for or 
against simply producing a sentence. But this is not compelling. One can treat the 
mere production of sentences as a normative matter by recognising norms that are 
distinctively semantic. There need be nothing mysterious in this idea, insofar as there 
is nothing mysterious in the idea that one is capable of subjecting oneself to a 
distinctive kind of norm by participating in a distinctive kind of practice (here, 
linguistic). While there is no doubt more to be said for and against this picture, the 
present point is that NT does not by itself lead to EM.  
 
4.2 Fregean and Sellarsian insights 
An alternative suggested route to EM is by reflection on certain insights of Frege and 
Sellars. I shall consider each in turn.  
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 Frege (1997) points out that two expressions can share a reference—for 
example, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’—while differing in cognitive significance. An 
adequate account of meaning—that meshes with one of understanding—should 
recognise that expressions in addition have ‘sense’. Perhaps the notion of sense is best 
cashed out in epistemic terms: 
for anyone who employs a notion of content constrained by Fregean considerations of 
cognitive significance, it is a consequence of the very nature of intentional content 
that evidence cannot be completely irrelevant. If, when we hold background 
information constant, there is something that is evidence for p but not evidence for q, 
it follows that p and q are distinct Fregean Thoughts. If we apply Frege’s classical 
test, someone with that evidence could rationally believe p but not believe q 
(Peacocke 2004: 34; see also 1998: 93). 
While the Fregean test might provide a means of distinguishing logically equivalent 
thoughts, one might ask whether the difference in what evidence warrants the 
assertoric use of a sentence is determinative of its meaning or merely a consequence 
of it. One can accept that, when two expressions are understood differently, different 
conditions will be taken to epistemically warrant their assertoric use, without holding 
that difference in evidential significance constitutes difference in cognitive 
significance; the reverse might be the case.  
 Second, the Frege point only requires recognition of something additional to 
an expression’s reference to account for its cognitive significance. Plausibly, what is 
further required is that the expression play a particular role in a person’s language 
(and thinking). One might, however, describe that role in terms of how a person 
combines it with other expressions, or what kind of transitions to and from sentences 
containing it she makes, rather than in terms of what might epistemically warrant its 
assertoric use and what that in turn might warrant. To put this in the terms introduced 
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above, difference in sense might consist in difference in sentential rather than 
illocutionary role.  
 Needless to say, there is not space here adequately to develop or defend such a 
picture. The present aim is only to illustrate how one might accept Fregean insights 
without accepting EM. 
 Alternatively, some take a Sellarsian insight to support EM. Sellars (1997) 
points out that merely reliably responding differentially to some environmental 
stimuli by tokening an expression—uttering ‘parrot’, for example, only in response to 
parrots—is not sufficient for understanding that expression or for it to have meaning. 
To put it vividly, it would not distinguish one who genuinely possesses understanding 
from a thermostat! A possible moral to draw, as Brandom remarks, is that ‘the key 
element missing’ in cases like thermostats is ‘mastery of the practices of giving and 
asking for reasons, in which their responses can play a role as justifying beliefs and 
claims’ (1994: 89). Hence, the thought continues, in characterising the meaning of an 
expression one must consider not only those environmental stimuli that typical elicit a 
person’s utterance but also ‘what follows from her claim and what it follows from, 
what would be evidence for it and what is incompatible with it’; that is, one must 
capture ‘its capacity to serve as evidence, as a reason for or against some 
commitment, theoretical or practical’ (2002: 351, 86). 
 That there is an intimate link between an expression’s meaning and how it 
might be employed in reasoning is intuitively attractive. But one can accept this 
without accepting EM. Perhaps understanding an expression requires, in addition to 
tokening it in response to stimuli, that one grasp (some subset of) what that which is 
said in its utterance entails and what entails it. More fundamentally, there must be 
certain transitions to and from sentences containing that expression that one is 
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prepared to make. This is a kind of inferentialism, which accommodates the Sellarsian 
insight, but further argument would be needed to show that one must cash it out in 
terms of the epistemic norms governing the relevant transitions, that one must view 
the extra required to understand an expression as appreciating what would provide 
(epistemic) reason for employing it in making a given assertion and what doing so 
provides reason for asserting or believing. 
 Again, there is not space here adequately to develop or defend such a picture. 
The present aim is only to show how one might accept Sellarsian insights without 
accepting EM. 
 In summary, it is not at all obvious that, in incorporating the Fregean and 
Sellarsian points, one needs to describe the ‘something extra’ required in terms of 
what epistemic proprieties an expression is subject to. While those insights might 
push us to UT, they need not push us to EM.  
 
4.3 Manifestation and circularity 
The argument for moderate and strong EM that has received most attention stems 
from Dummett’s manifestation requirement (1991: 13ff; 1993: 46ff, 70ff; see also 
Wright 1993: 13ff). Accordingly, I shall be brief and rely on the remarks of others.
24
 
 Inspired by UT, Dummett introduces the following requirement. A theory of 
meaning must avoid attributing to speakers understanding of an expression that could 
not be manifest in the use made of it. (Non-epistemic) truth-conditional accounts of 
meaning—according to which one gives the meaning of ‘The Cornish language died 
out many years ago’, for example, in giving its truth-condition, namely, that the 
Cornish language died out many years ago—supposedly fall foul of this requirement. 
Such accounts would associate with sentences concerning, say, the distant past or 
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unreachable places truth-conditions that transcend evidence. Since speakers are not in 
a position to adjust their linguistic behaviour in response to the obtaining of those 
conditions, truth-conditional accounts attribute understanding incapable of 
manifestation. Alternatively, an account of the meaning of expressions given in terms 
of their use being subject to epistemic norms will (trivially) satisfy the requirement, 
since it is built into it that the standards speakers must grasp are not beyond their ken. 
 Following McDowell (1998a: ch. 15) and Schiffer (1987: 224), one might 
challenge the sparse resources that Dummett allows for manifestation, namely 
behavioural responses to the obtaining of perceptual conditions. One might surely 
display one’s understanding of ‘The Cornish language died out many years ago’ by 
using it to say that the Cornish language died out many years ago. Alternatively, and 
more fundamentally, one might manifest it by displaying sensitivity to what the claim 
thereby made entails and what entails it, or by explaining the terms involved. It does 
not seem, then, that only EM can satisfy the manifestation requirement. 
 One might object that the above accounts of manifestation employ semantic 
notions, such as saying that or entailment. While this allows them trivially to satisfy 
the manifestation requirement, it does so at a cost: circularity. Indeed, fully stated, 
Dummett’s requirement is that one offer an account of manifestation in non-semantic 
terms, such that it affords an explanation of what meaning and understanding consist 
in. Accordingly, his real complaint is that ‘Truth-conditional theories of meaning […] 
are irredeemably circular’. In contrast, ‘A non-circular theory of meaning would 
represent knowledge of the meaning of a sentence or word as knowing how to use that 
sentence or word’ and, specifically, what ‘justifies’ its assertoric use (2006: 51, 56).
25
 
 First, it is far from clear that providing a reductionist account of meaning in 
independently intelligible and more basic terms of any sort is either feasible or 
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desirable.
26
 Instead, one might offer some kind of non-reductionist elucidation that 
traces relations of mutual interdependency between and thereby sheds light on the 
relevant concepts. Since circularity need not, by default, be vicious, Dummett’s 
manifestation argument is inconclusive. 
 Second, in any case one might be able to offer a non-epistemic, used-based 
theory of meaning in non-semantic terms, which would deliver an account of how 
understanding would be manifest. According to such a theory, an expression’s 
meaning is determined by the fact that various transitions between sentences 
involving it are treated as correct or incorrect, that combining it with others in certain 
ways is counted as permissible or impermissible, that uttering it in certain 
circumstances is allowed or not. No semantic terms appear explicitly in this story and 
it is not hard to see how, according to it, understanding might be fully exhibited.  
 Both the preceding points involve substantial promissory notes that cannot be 
cashed in here. The present aim is only to show that the manifestation and non-
circularity requirements do not provide immediate support for EM. 
 
4.4 Constitutive ideals 
Another route to EM might be to view norms of meaning as derived from (or as 
included in) certain rationality constraints. Plausibly, it is constitutive of a person’s 
having psychological attitudes that those attitudes are, by and large, rational; they 
must suitably cohere with one another and appear reasonable in the light of her 
behaviour and environment.
27
 As part of conforming to this ideal, a person’s use of 
words to express her psychological attitudes must satisfy certain epistemic norms. 
 Whatever the merits of the view that conforming to principles of rationality is 
constitutive of possessing psychological attitudes, it does not lead to EM. The 
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requirement that a speaker satisfy rationality constraints is general and does not have 
immediate implications for how she is to use particular words. There is an indefinite 
number of ways in which a person might approximate to the ideal. Hence, that such a 
requirement is in force has no immediate implications for what norms would have to 
govern an expression in order that it have meaning. 
 A more specific instance of the general idea is that assertion is constitutively 
governed by epistemic norms. In Dummett’s view, ‘The fact that the use of language 
is a conscious rational activity—we might say the rational activity—of intelligent 
agents must be incorporated into’ a theory of meaning, ‘because it is integral to the 
phenomenon of human language’ (1991: 91).  One way to do so would be to suggest 
that there is some ‘basic principle of the practice of assertion’, such as (Skorupski 
1997: 32):
28
 
(A) One correctly uses a sentence to make an assertion if and only if one is 
justified in believing, of the proposition expressed by that use of the 
sentence, that it is true. 
It is indeed plausible that some such principle is not merely regulative but constitutive 
of the practice of assertion. Moreover, unlike the more general rationality 
requirements, (A) promises to provide a link with an account of the meanings of 
particular expressions, insofar as what proposition a particular sentence expresses, and 
hence whether one satisfies (A) in assertorically using it, is a matter of its meaning. 
 Nonetheless, once one keeps in view the act/object distinction, the putative 
insight that according with a principle such as (A) is constitutive of assertion does not 
support EM. The epistemic norm (A) expresses governs the act of asserting. But EM 
is a thesis concerning its object, what is asserted. One can accept that epistemic norms 
attach to, and are constitutive of, the former without accepting that they attach to, and 
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are constitutive of, the latter. Indeed, surely what counts on an occasion as satisfying 
the epistemic norms governing an asserting is determined at least in part by what is 
asserted, and so by the meaning of the sentence employed. Indeed, as the formulation 
of (A) itself suggests, only if the expression used has an antecedently determined 
meaning, is already assertible, could a principle such as (A) apply. Thus, the plausible 
suggestion that epistemic norms are constitutive of asserting is not grounds for taking 
them to be constitutive of meaning, and so for accepting EM.  
 
5 Closing remarks 
I suggested that EM, a theory of meaning accepted by a number of prominent 
contemporary philosophers, is problematic. In particular, it presents the wrong picture 
of the kinds of mistakes people make in employing expressions. This prompted a re-
assessment of the arguments offered in support of EM. Those considered typically 
begin from seemingly unobjectionable premises—such as UT, NT, the Fregean and 
Sellarsian points, the manifestation requirement, the constitutively normative nature 
of assertion—but accepting them does not require accepting EM. Indeed, it should not 
be overlooked that many of EM’s proponents have been foremost in introducing and 
insisting upon these putative insights. One thing that emerges from this paper is that 
one can accept those insights as genuine, and applaud the advocate of EM for 
highlighting them, while not going so far as to accept the picture of meaning that they 
advance. 
 At root, EM suffers from, and trades on, a kind of act/object confusion. The 
significance of this is that it mislocates the norms determinative of meaning. Only if 
they govern the assertoric act of asserting can they be properly described as epistemic, 
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but only if they attach to the sentential act of producing the object, what is asserted, 
can they be viewed as semantic. EM tries, unsuccessfully, to have it both ways.  
 Accordingly, I have denied neither that epistemic norms constitutively govern 
assertion nor that for an expression to have meaning is for its use to be subject to 
norms, but only that one keep apart these two plausible theses. While there is a 
connection between them worth charting—it is surely in part because of the semantic 
standards governing the expressions used that a particular act of assertion is subject to 
epistemic evaluation—it is not one of identity. 
 Of course, this leaves the task of providing an alternative account of the norms 
that are supposedly determinative of meaning. It is not clear to me that one will be 
able to say very much about this matter that is informative. In particular, one might 
only be able to single them out using semantic notions of the same kind as that of 
meaning. Undertaking this task is, however, for another occasion.
29
 
 
References 
Alston, W. (2000), Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. New York: Cornell 
University Press. 
Austin, J. L. (1962), How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Baker, G. and Hacker, P. (2004), Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, 2
nd
 ed. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Berlin, I. (1968), ‘Verification’, in G. Parkinson (ed.) The Theory of Meaning. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Blackburn, S. (1984), ‘The Individual Strikes Back’, Synthese, 58: 281–301. 
Boghossian, P. (1989), ‘The Rule-Following Considerations’, Mind, 98: 507–549. 
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning 
 22 
— (2003a), ‘Blind Reasoning’, The Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 77: 
225–248. 
— (2003b), ‘Epistemic Analyticity: a Defense’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 66: 
15–35. 
— (2005), ‘Is Meaning Normative?’, in A. Beckermann and C. Nimtz (eds.) 
Philosophy – Science – Scientific Philosophy. Paderborn: Mentis. 
Brandom, R. (1994), Making it Explicit. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
— (2000), Articulating Reasons. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 
— (2002), Tales of the Mighty Dead. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 
Carnap, R. (1959), ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of 
Language’, in A. J. Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Davidson, D. (2001), Essays on Actions and Events, 2
nd
 ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Dummett, M. (1991), The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. London: Duckworth. 
— (1993), The Seas of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2006), Thought and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Frege, G. (1997), ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung’, in M. Beaney (ed.) The Frege Reader. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Gibbard, A. (1994), ‘Meaning and Normativity’, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Truth and 
Rationality. Ascadero, California: Ridgeview. 
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning 
 23 
Glock, H-J. (2005), ‘The Normativity of Meaning Made Simple’, in A. Beckermann 
and C. Nimtz (eds.) Philosophy – Science – Scientific Philosophy. Paderborn: 
Mentis. 
Glüer, K. (1999), ‘Sense and Prescriptivity’, Acta Analytica, 14: 111-28. 
Grayling, A. (1997), An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, 3
rd
 ed. Oxford 
Blackwell. 
— (2007), Truth, Meaning and Realism. London: Continuum. 
Hale, B. (1997), ‘Realism and its Oppositions’, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.) A 
Companion to Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Harman, G. (1999), Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hattiangadi, A. (2006), ‘Is Meaning Normative?’, Mind and Language, 21: 220–40. 
Hempel, C. (1959), ‘The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning’, in A. J. Ayer (ed.) Logical 
Positivism. London: Allen and Unwin. 
Hornsby, J. (1994), ‘Illocution and its Significance’, in S. Tsohatzidsis (ed.) 
Foundations of Speech Act Theory. London: Routledge. 
— (2006), ‘Speech Acts and Performatives’, in E. Lepore and B. Smith (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Horwich, P. (2005), Reflections on Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kripke, S. (1982), Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lance, M. and O’Leary Hawthorne, J. (1998), The Grammar of Meaning. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lepore, E. (1994), ‘Conceptual Role Semantics’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.) A Companion 
to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Luntley, M. (1999), Contemporary Philosophy of Thought. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lycan, W. (2000), Philosophy of Language. London: Routledge. 
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning 
 24 
McDowell, J. (1998a), Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
— (1998b), Mind, Value, and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Millar, A. (2002), ‘The Normativity of Meaning’, in A. O’Hear (ed.) Logic, Thought 
and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Miller, A. (2006), ‘Meaning Scepticism’, in M. Devitt and R. Hanley (ed.) The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Neurath, O. (1959), ‘Protocol Sentences’, in A. J. Ayer (ed.) Logical Positivism. 
London: Allen and Unwin. 
Peacocke, C. (1998), ‘The Philosophy of Language’, in A. Grayling (ed.) Philosophy 
2: Further through the Subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
— (2004), The Realm of Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Putnam, H. (1975), Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
— (1978), Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge. 
— (1983), Realism and Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Quine, W. V. O. (1969), Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
— (1980), From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Ryle, G. (1968), ‘Use, Usage and Meaning’, in G. Parkinson (ed.) The Theory of 
Meaning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schiffer, S. (1987), Remnants of Meaning. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning 
 25 
Schlick, M. (1959), ‘Positivism and Realism’, in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism. 
London: Allen and Unwin. 
Sellars, W. (1953), ‘Inference and Meaning’, Mind, 62: 313-338. 
— (1997), Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
Skorupski, J. (1986), ‘Empiricism, Verificationism and the A Priori’, in G. 
Macdonald and C. Wright (eds.) Fact, Science and Morality. Oxford: Blackwell. 
— (1988), ‘Critical Study of Crispin Wright’s Realism, Meaning and Truth’, 
Philosophical Quarterly, 38: 500-525. 
— (1993), ‘Anti-Realism, Inference and the Logical Constants’, in J. Haldane and C. 
Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
— (1997), ‘Meaning, Use, Verification’, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.) A 
Companion to Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Stroud, B. (2000), Meaning, Understanding, and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Waismann, F. (1968), ‘Verifiability’, in G. Parkinson (ed.) The Theory of Meaning. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Waismann, F. and Wittgenstein, L. (2003), The Voices of Wittgenstein, ed. G. Baker, 
G. Baker, M. Mackert, J. Connolly and V. Politis, trans. London: Routledge. 
Wedgwood, R. (2001), ‘Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms’, Philosophical 
Review, 110: 1-30. 
Whiting, D. (2006), ‘Between Primitivism and Naturalism’, Acta Analytica, 21: 1-22. 
— (2007), ‘The Normativity of Meaning Defended’, Analysis, 67: 133-140. 
Wikforss, A. (2001), ‘Semantic Normativity’, Philosophical Studies, 102: 203–226. 
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning 
 26 
Williamson, T. (2000), Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wittgenstein, L. (1967), Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3
rd
 
ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
— (1969), The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell. 
— (1974), Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny. Oxford: 
Blackwell.  
— (1975), On Certainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. D. 
Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. 
— (1978), Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, G. 
H. von Wright, and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 3
rd
 ed. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
— (1979), Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932—1935, ed. A. Ambrose. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Wright, C. (1992), Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press.  
— (1993), Realism, Meaning and Truth, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
— (2003), Saving the Differences. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press. 
On Epistemic Conceptions of Meaning 
 27 
Notes 
 
1
 The concern of this paper is the normativity of meaning, where ‘meaning’ refers to 
the invariant significance possessed by words and sentences of a natural language. 
Many philosophers extend the normativity thesis to the content of attitudes such as 
beliefs, desires and hopes. To what extent mental content is normative, and whether 
the relevant norms are akin to those of meaning, will not be discussed here, although 
no doubt what follows has implications for such issues. 
2
 See, e.g., Alston 2000; Brandom 1994; Dummett 1993; Harman 1999; Horwich 
2005; Ryle 1968; Sellars 1953; Skorupski 1993. 
3
 That is not to suggest that UT is without problems. For critical overviews of the 
prominent objections, see Lepore 1994; Lycan 2000: ch.6. 
4
 For recent criticism, see Boghossian 2005; Glüer 1999; Hattiangadi 2006; Miller 
2006; Wikforss 2001. For recent defence, see Glock 2005; Whiting 2007. 
5
 See, e.g., Alston 2000; Baker and Hacker 2004; Blackburn 1984; Boghossian 1989; 
Brandom 1994; Gibbard 1994; Glock 2005; Kripke 1982; Lance and O’Leary 
Hawthorne 1998; Luntley 1999; McDowell 1998b: ch.11; Skorupski 1997. 
6
 Likewise, Glüer notes that ‘hardly anyone takes much trouble about explaining what 
this normativity amounts to’ (1999: 112). 
7
 There are, it should be noted, non-normative versions of EM. According to Quine, 
for example, ‘all inculcation of meaning of words’ rests ‘ultimately on sensory 
evidence’, where evidence is characterised as the ‘stimulation of sensory receptors’ 
(1969: 75). Few contemporary proponents of EM would, however, endorse this idea 
(see Dummett 1993: 104; Brandom 1994: xiii). One reason for this is the worry that 
facts about dispositions to respond to sensory stimuli leave meaning radically 
indeterminate, as Quine himself insists. 
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8
 Strong EM is, evidently, a form of verificationism. As such, it might be open to 
some of the well-known criticisms levelled at verificationism (see, e.g., Berlin 1968; 
Grayling 1997: 217ff; Hempel 1959; Lycan 2000: 120ff; Neurath 1959; Putnam 1975; 
Quine 1980: ch. 2; Schiffer 1987: 228ff). I shall not rehearse those objections here 
since, first, they are already familiar and well-worn and, second, I intend to focus on 
EM generally rather than a specific variant of it. 
Note that not all versions of verificationism are epistemic. One might interpret 
verificationism as a kind of inferentialism, according to which an expression’s 
possessing meaning consists in its standing in relations of entailment. Talk of what 
verifies the assertoric use of an expression might be intended as talk of what the claim 
thereby made follows from. This appears to be how Waismann understands matters. 
In describing the verification of a statement, he says, ‘I establish a connexion between 
two statements by saying that the one (s) is to follow from the other (p). In other 
words, I lay down a rule of inference which allows me to pass from the one to the 
other’ (1968: 36; cf. Waismann and Wittgenstein 2003: 117). Moving from such 
(incipient) inferentialism to the idea that the norms governing inferential transitions 
are to be cashed out in epistemic terms requires a further step. This point will be of 
significance later.
 
 
Relatedly, Skorupski (1986: 156) astutely observes that (for different reasons) 
the verificationism of positivists such as Carnap (1959: 63) and Schlick (1959: 86-7) 
does not amount to EM. 
9
 Cf. Brandom’s claim that ‘talk of what is expressed is intelligible only in the context 
of talk of the activity of grasping what is expressed’, since ‘meaning and 
understanding are coordinate concepts’ (1994: 73). 
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10
 Proponents of EM would not consider it sufficient for understanding an expression 
that a person merely act in conformity with (rather than ‘grasp’) the epistemic norms 
governing its use. For reasons familiar from Kripke (1982), any such behaviour would 
be in accordance with an indefinite number of standards. More is needed to determine 
that a person is following one such norm rather than any other. Typically, what is 
thought to be required is that, in some sense, the relevant norm figure among her 
reasons for acting as she does. As Brandom puts it, one must recognise that their 
‘compulsion is mediated by our attitude toward those rules. What makes us act as we 
do is not the rule or norm itself but our acknowledgement of it’ (1994: 31). 
11
 Due to Dummett (1991; 1993), EM in the philosophy of language is usually 
associated with anti-realism in metaphysics. For a critical overview of the debate, see 
Hale 1997. I shall not comment here on the connection, or on the extent to which my 
arguments against EM count as arguments against anti-realism.  
12
 Although note that in more recent writings Skorupski holds that the ‘important 
insights contained in the epistemic conception’ should be treated ‘as insights about the 
normative nature of concepts rather than as insights about the form of language-rules’ 
(1997: 29). This qualification does not bear significantly on what follows. 
13
 Grayling also appears sympathetic to EM (see, e.g., 2007: 55). 
14
 Glock (2005) and Millar (2002) employ similar strategies to different ends. Millar 
considers different mistakes in arguing against the view that the norms of meaning are 
norms of truth, while Glock does so in arguing for NT generally. 
15
 I do not intend this claim to rest on any particular account of what constitutes 
epistemic justification. If one has a more (or less) stringent view on what is required 
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for an act to be epistemically justified, it should be possible to plug it in here and for 
the point to remain the same. 
16
 Of course, the claim that Bernard intended to make —that the common lizard is 
Britain’s smallest reptile—might have been well-grounded. But the issue concerns the 
status of the act he did in fact perform. 
17
 Note that there are two ways to describe this example. First, since what is required 
for a particular expression to possess meaning is that its employment be governed by 
a suitable norm, not that it actually be used in accordance with it, one might say that, 
given the meanings of the constituent expressions employed as determined by the 
established norms of for their employment, Bernard (inadvertently) utters a sentence 
that means the common lizard is Britain’s smallest mammal. Alternatively, one might 
want to say that strictly-speaking and despite appearances Bernard fails to produce a 
meaningful sentence at all since he is not abiding by the relevant norms in producing 
those expressions. That is, though (6) looks like an English sentence it is not one, 
because Bernard did not produce it in accordance with the norms embodied in the 
practice of speaking English. Either way, the same point applies, namely that 
Bernard’s semantic impropriety precludes epistemic assessment. 
18
 If one does not share this intuition for this particular case, and feels inclined to 
judge (7) false rather than meaningless, one can easily imagine a still more confused 
sentence. Presumably there will be a point at which, given how the words used are 
ordinarily to be understood, one will be able to attach no meaning to the sentence 
formed from them. 
19
 See also Putnam 1978: 97, 129; Skorupski 1988: 501; 1993: 133; Wright 1993: 
358-9. 
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20
 Indeed, several philosophers do so (see, e.g., Alston 2000; Horwich 2005). 
21
 The term ‘illocutionary act’ is Austin’s (1962), while ‘sentential act’ is Alston’s 
(2000). The latter corresponds, closely enough, to Austin’s ‘locutionary act’. For a 
recent and lucid account of the different acts one can perform in employing an 
expression, and the respects in which the illocutionary is dependent upon the 
sentential, see Alston 2000. Hornsby’s suggestion that an account of locution (or 
sentential acts) concerns ‘the linguistically meaningful […] things that speakers of the 
language do when they produce particular sentences’, whereas one of illocution 
concerns the ‘communicative things that can be done with words’ (2006: 896, 902; cf. 
1994), makes especially clear the respect in which matters of meaning pertain, in the 
first instance, to the sentential rather than the illocutionary level. 
22
 When considering the normativity thesis, Boghossian considers only two ways of 
interpreting the relevant notion of correctness, as truth or warrant (1989: 513). 
23
 Note that Wright’s argument here is a stage in a larger argument designed, not to 
establish EM, but to establish that deflationist theories of truth are unstable. I shall not 
assess the larger argument here. Note also that I do not take the criticisms that follow 
to undermine Wright’s overarching project, which is premised on the idea that 
satisfying certain syntactic and disciplinary requirements is sufficient for a predicate 
to be one of truth. 
24
 Strictly-speaking, the manifestation argument is supposed to demonstrate the need 
to recognise an epistemically constrained notion of truth, one which is to figure in a 
semantic theory representing a person’s understanding of a language. Here I am 
considering whether one might exploit the manifestation argument in arguing directly 
for epistemic conceptions of meaning in general. Dummett also has an acquisition 
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argument, which requires that an account of meaning leave it intelligible how a person 
might acquire understanding of a language. To save space, and since it is almost 
universally acknowledged to be the less forceful of the two (see Wright 1993: 
Introduction), I shall not discuss it here. Note, again, that I shall not assess the bearing 
of either argument on the debate between realists and anti-realists. 
25
 See also Putnam’s remark that ‘you can’t treat understanding a sentence (in 
general) as knowing its truth-conditions, because it then becomes unintelligible what 
that knowledge in turn consists in’. Instead, ‘the theory of understanding has to be 
done in a verificationist way’ (1978: 129; cf. 3). 
26
 For considerations in support of the view that a reductionist account of meaning is 
neither needed nor available see Boghossian 1989; McDowell 1998b: ch. 11; Stroud 
2000: ch. 11; Whiting 2006. 
27
 Davidson (2001: 221-3) advances this idea, and McDowell (1998b: ch.15) 
elaborates it (though neither present it as supporting EM). 
28
 For a variant, see Williamson 2000, according to which the norm constitutive of 
assertion requires that one know the proposition expressed. Note that Williamson 
nowhere suggests that such a norm might be constitutive of the meanings of the 
expressions used. He rightly presents the view as concerning asserting rather than 
what is asserted. 
29
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